Abstract
B ackground
The object o f this contribution is to plot the parameters within which religious rights are protected in the Chapter on Fundamental Rights (chapter 3) in South A frica's transitional constitution. The freedom o f religion clause (section 14) and provisions amplifying and enhancing it (see 5. below) cannot be fully understood in isolation. The genesis o f chapter 3 and the hermeneutical context constituted by the chapter as a whole will therefore first briefly be looked at.
On only one occasion have a diversity o f organised religious communities in South Africa indicated a shared preference for a specific freedom o f religion clause in a bill o f rights. This proposed clause w as included as an addendum to the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities which w as finally ap proved and adopted by a National Inter-Faith Conference held in Pretoria (from 22 to 24 N ovember 1992) under the auspices o f the South African Chapter o f the World Conference on Religion and Peace. The freedom o f religion provisions in South Africa's transitional bill o f rights will be assessed in view o f both this pro posed clause (hereinafter referred to as the W .C.R.P.-S.A . proposed clause) and, to a lesser extent, certain universally accepted standards for the protection o f reli gious rights and freedoms. Specific articles o f the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities agreed on by the National Inter-Faith Conference will also be taken into account but the declaration as a whole will not be considered.
T he genesis o f the C hapter on Fundam ental R ights
The Negotiating Council o f the M ulti-Party Negotiating Process in Kempton Park appointed seven technical committees -o f which the Technical Com mittee on Fundamental Rights during the Transition was one -to assist it in its deliberations in key areas. The Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights w as informed that its first task would be to compile a limited list o f fundamental rights to be en trenched during the transition. Agreeing to this list in the plenary sessions o f the negotiating council turned out to be a tug o f w ar between m inim alists and optimalists which, in the end, resulted in a compromise.
The minimalists, mainly the African National Congress and its allies, argued that the list should include only those rights indispensable to the political process o f transition. The optimalists, on the other hand, which w ere mainly parties who later withdrew from the Negotiating Process to form the Freedom Alliance, con tended for the fullest possible list o f rights. The South African G overnm ent-N a tional Party alliance initially also signalled preference for the optimalist position but not at all costs.
The minimalist position coincided with the broader political view that the MultiParty Negotiating Council, as an insufficiently representative -and therefore not really legitimate -political forum, could at most agree to a transitional constitution. A more representative legislative cum constituent assembly, elected in terms o f the transitional constitution, would eventually have to decide on a final constitu tion. The minimalists w ere mainly those parties and alliances believed to enjoy majority popular support. The optimalist position, on the other hand, w as under pinned by a strongly held view that the Multi-Party Negotiating Council w as the appropriate authority to decide on a final constitution which should -especially in its chapter on fundamental rights -embody the fullest possible number o f ab solute guarantees pertaining to a 'final' dispensation. The optimalists were par ties and alliances with vested political power interests but limited popular support fearing marginalisation in a proportionally representative constitution-making process.
The Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights w as mandated to identify those rights which would be 'fundamental to the transition' but was not told how long the transition w as expected to last and precisely how fundamental the rights iden tified had to be. The technical committee, in its first progress report, listed the rights which it regarded as basic to the functioning o f a democratic system o f go vernment. In its second and third progress reports it formulated criteria for the inclusion o f rights in the transitional constitution. The negotiating council at no stage really approved o f these criteria but agreed to the inclusion o f the list of rights contained in the technical com mittee's third progress report.
This list o f rights is, from a jurisprudential point o f view, neither fatally anorectic nor satisfactorily comprehensive. Significant second generation (socio-economic) and third generation ('green' and group) rights had, for instance, not been in cluded in the final list. The few rights in these two categories which were indeed included (with the exception o f children's rights in section 30) enjoy but restric ted protection and the sections entrenching them are also restrictively phrased.
The often conflicting ideological or 'philosophical' forces at work in the process o f drafting chapter 3 can be classified with reference to two human rights tradi tions which have become visible in South Africa over the last fifty years, namely a libertarian and a liberationist tradition. These traditions are both 'liberal' in the sense that they share a basic commitment to a quintessence o f liberal-demo cratic values, but they do so with a marked difference in emphasis.
The proponents o f the libertarian tradition have mainly been white liberals who have expressed their opposition to authoritarian government and to apartheid in ('the old') South Africa in human rights terms. They have, however, during es pecially the last three years been joined by newcomers from the ranks o f those who used to help uphold the apartheid regime but who have come to realise that the entrenchment o f their basic rights in a libertarian vein could in future best serve their vested interests.
Ideologically the libertarian tradition draws heavily on classical (enlightenment) liberalism and contends for a bill o f rights premising its value system on indivi dual liberty (and not equality) as a core value. In respect o f state authority vis á vis individual autonomy libertarians assume an abstentionist (or 'h an d s-o ff) atti tude.
The liberationist tradition becam e South Africa's first visible human rights tradi tion with the adoption, in 1943, o f the African National Congress document, Afri can Claims in South Africa, followed by the Freedom Charter in 1955. In these formative documents rights sentiments are, generally speaking, expressed as a combination o f political ideals and demands. The ideological underpinnings o f the liberationist tradition range from social dem ocracy to dem ocratic socialism, with the former probably predominating at present. The liberationist tradition is, at any rate, markedly egalitarian in its basic approach.
The liberationist and libertarian traditions share a profound loyalty to a distinct core o f time -honoured liberal and democratic values which includes an unques tioning deference to freedom o f conscience, religion and belief. N egotiating par ties, moreover, seemed to have shared the view that walls o f separation between church/religion and state/politics are undesirable. All this explains why the constitutionalisation o f the rights implied by these freedoms was preponderantly uncontentious. However, the right to establish educational institutions based on, amongst others, a common religion (see section 32(c) and 5.1 below) w as poten tially contentious since it can be exercised in such a w ay that it serves as a pretext for 'privatised' discrimination. This explains why its possible constitutionalisation w as used as a 'bargaining chip' in bilateral discussions between the govern ment and the ANC and why it was eventually entrenched subject to an explicit prohibition o f racial discrimination (see further 5.1 below).
T he context o f the C hapter on Fundam ental Rights

Its style
The provisions o f the Chapter on Fundamental Rights are couched in a language reflecting preference for a particular style o f formulation in which entitlements are expressed as general norms, as broadly as possible, and reliance on lists o f speci fic and detailed guarantees and conditions have been avoided (see in general Corder et al., 1992:17-18 ; see also the Fifth Progress Report o f the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights par. 2). This is in stark contrast with the in flation o f language characterising the traditional way o f formulating statutes in South Africa using 'many w ords to say few things'. There are m ajor advantages to a bill o f rights using few words to say many things:
*
It allows for the use o f simple language which is readily accessible to the citizenry. The rights and freedoms as expressed in the bill o f rights can re latively easily be understood and the formulations can become part o f eve ryday usage instead o f remaining the province o f lawyers.
In constitutional review proceedings complicated formulations are likely to focus attention on the 'true meaning' o f w ords and phrases rather than the really crucial question whether a right or freedom has been infringed. 
Its application
Chapter 3 o f the transitional constitution is introduced by a provision stating that the chapter shall bind the legislative and executive organs o f the state at all levels o f government (section 7(1)) which, according to the definition clause (section 232), includes all statutory bodies and functionaries. A further subsection (sec tion 7(2)) subjects all law in force as well as all administrative decisions taken and acts performed to the provisions o f the chapter for so long as it is in ope ration. This provision should be read with section 33(2) which states that no provision o f the constitution and no rule o f law (whether it be a rule o f common or customary law or o f legislation) shall limit any right entrenched in chapter 3 in a w ay other than that provided for in section 33(1) (see 3.4 below).
What such an approach entails, cannot be fiilly explained within the confines of the present article, and for a fuller exposition I can but refer to another series of articles which I coauthored, namely Du Plessis & Dc Ville (1993a Ville ( , 1993b Ville ( and 1993c .
"Appropriate re lie f' can be sought when an entrenched right is infringed or threatened (section 7(4)(a)) and prospective applicants' right to approach a court on these grounds is defined extensively (section 7(4)(b)) so as to include, for in stance, standing to bring an action in the interest o f somebody else (section 7(4)(b)(iii)) or o f a group or class o f persons (section 7(4)(b)(iv)) or in the public interest (section 7(4)(b)(v)).
These ostensibly unceremonious opening statements o f chapter 3 read with sec tion 4(1) which declares the constitution to be "the supreme law o f the Republic", indeed herald a Copemican revolution in South African law and the legal system. For the first time in the history o f this country a sovereign constitution construed and applied by the judiciary and, in particular, a specialist constitutional court2 which will hopefully be o f balanced composition, will trump legislative and ex ecutive notions o f what just and equitable governance entails.
Chapter 3, in other words, forms the basis o f a system o f cross-and double checking which curbs the pow ers o f the legislature and the executive. In concrete terms this means that any law violating a religious right or freedom can be struck down by an appropriate court o f law and that any administrative act which has this effect can be undone in a similar w ay and its damaging consequences can, as far as possible, be repaired.
It w as a matter o f contention among parties participating in the Multi-Party N ego tiating Process w hether the provisions o f chapter 3 should be enforceable against the state and its organs only or whether they should bind both the state and pri vate social institutions and persons. In the end it was agreed that the chapter should operate vertically only3 but that provision be made for a seepage to ho rizontal relationships. As a result a subsection was included in the interpretation clause requiring any court o f law applying and developing the existing law to have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects o f the chapter (section 35(3)).
To allay fears that the predominantly vertical operation o f chapter 3 can be con strued as authorising 'privatised apartheid', a provision w as also included in the limitation clause (section 33) permitting measures designed to prohibit unfair dis crimination by (private) bodies and persons not explicitly bound by the chapter (section 33(4)).
The sections in chapter 3 which entrench religious rights (and other rights ampli fying and enhancing them) should therefore be understood subject to the almost Provided for in sections 98-100 of the transitional constitution.
Hence section 7( 1) which subjects (only) the legislative and executive organs of the state to the provisions of chapter 3 -sec above.
exclusively vertical operation o f the chapter. This means that individual members o f a religious community will not be able to invoke the provisions o f the chapter in order to challenge rules laid down, decisions taken or acts performed by the structures o f authority within their communities. The chapter mainly protects religious individuals' and communities' religious freedom against infringing laws and actions from the state (and guarantees non-religious individuals' and com munities' freedom not to believe in a similar way). "The state" includes, as was pointed out at the beginning o f this paragraph, the legislature and the executive at all levels o f government (section 7(1)) as well as statutory bodies and functionaries (section 232). This means that, for instance, local authorities, public broadcasters such as the SABC and universities are also bound by the chapter and that any conduct on their part which is allegedly discriminatory on religious grounds or which impinges on religious freedom, will be challengeable in terms of chapter 3.
The seepage to horizontal relationships provided for in the interpretation clause (section 35(3)) may also affect the existing (common and statutory) law regulat ing the relationship between religious communities and their members. Because any court o f law applying and developing the existing law is required to have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects o f chapter 3, the courts will probably in terpret and apply the law regulating horizontal relationships as much as possible in conformity with the rights enshrined in the chapter. The relationship between an individual member and his or her religious community is -in so far as the member is subject to the community's structures o f authority -at any rate not a purely 'horizontal' relationship. The reason for having a bill o f rights as the in dividual's instrument o f protection against the abuse o f authority by the state therefore also exists (in principle) in the case o f religious communities. The courts may therefore be inclined to incorporate the values enshrined in chapter 3 into the existing law dealing with the relationship between the structures o f autho rity o f a religious community and its individual members.
The previously mentioned section 33(4), which authorises measures designed to prohibit unfair discrimination by bodies and persons not referred to in section 7(1) and therefore not explicitly bound by chapter 3, makes it possible for the state to interfere with the 'private' relationship between an individual and his or her relig ious community in order to prevent religion from being used as a pretext for (privatised) discrimination.
Its interpretation (and international law)
A court o f law interpreting chapter 3 is, first o f all, required to "promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality" (section 35(1)). The exact implications o f this value statement will have to be spelt out by the South African courts (and especially the constitutional court) in due course. (Henkin, 1985:271) . Some o f these norms vouch for religious freedom6 and are part and parcel o f public international law applicable to the religious rights entrenched in chapter 3 o f South A frica's transi tional constitution. A court o f law, in interpreting those provisions o f chapter 3 relating to religious freedom, is therefore required to have regard to the said norms o f customary international law.
The limitation and suspension o f entrenched rights
It is generally accepted that rights enshrined in a bill o f rights are limitable. It is, however, an open question whether it is possible to limit all such rights. The right to religious freedom, for instance, entails religious practices which are surely susceptible to circumscription, but the right to freedom o f conscience or belief, which is not so concretely 'exercised', lacks these readily circumscribable mani festations. On the other hand, there are certain rights which is generally believed I.e. chapter 3.
And further amplified in the U N. General Assembly's Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion and Belief (proclaimed on 25 November 1981) -see also Ramcharan (1987) .
For the evolution of universal standards of religious liberty, see Ramcharan (1987) .
should not be limited, for instance the right not to be subject to torture (see sec tion 11(2)).
Section 33 (1) The limitation o f certain specified rights is subject to a stricter test than the one which normally applies: their limitation must, in addition to being reasonable, also be necessary (section 33(1 )(aa) and (bb)). Among the rights in this category are the rights to freedom o f religion, belief and opinion entrenched in section 14(1) (see section 33(l)(aa)).
Section 34 provides for strict conditions on which rights can be suspended during a state o f emergency, but here all the rights entrenched in section 14 have been listed with those rights which can, even under these circumstances and on the said strict conditions, not be suspended (section 34(5)(c)).
Religious freedom is no doubt high on the priority list o f basic freedoms singled out for protection in national as well as international human rights instruments. Some regard it as "the most sacred o f all freedoms" (Robertson, 1991:124) and it "appeared as the first fundamental human right in political instruments o f both national and international character long before the idea o f systematic protection o f civil and political rights was developed" (Partsch, 1981:209 ; see also Robert son, 1991:124).7 Rights which are so eminently fundamental are, in term s o f in ternational human rights standards, usually regarded as non-derogatable8 which means that they cannot be suspended even in time o f a publicly proclaimed emer gency when the life o f the nation is threatened.9 Accordingly, article 4(2) o f the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights explicitly provides for the non-derogatibility o f the religious rights and freedoms enshrined in article 18. The rule o f non-derogatibility has probably also become part o f customary inter national law binding on every state irrespective o f whether it is a party to any in ternational convention or covenant (Henkin, 1985: 271; see also 3.3 above).
Permissible limitations furthermore seem to apply exclusively to the freedom to m anifest religious beliefs and not to the freedom to h old them (Partsch, 1981: 210; see also 4 below). In the same vein freedom o f conscience, thought and opinion, in so far as they have not been concretely manifested, are probably also illimit able.
The limitation o f religious rights could prove to be more problem atic than may appear at first sight. No state could possibly permit, for example, enforced po lygamy, ritual murders or public disturbance in the name o f exercising religious freedom (Robertson, 1991:125) : limitations on religious practices which endan ger life or health or contravene public morals should, in other w ords, somehow be permissible (Partsch, 1981:212 n. 11 at 4 47).10 On the other hand, tyrannical regimes often profess to guarantee the free exercise o f religion while, at the same time, they suppress full expression o f its political and social consequences, and do so in the name o f justifiably circumscribing concrete manifestations o f relig ious freedom (Robertson, 1991:124) . This happened, to a large extent, in South Africa under the apartheid regime (Robertson, 1991:126-127) . The lines o f de-' See e.g. the first paragraph of the Agreement of the People (of England) of 28 October 1647 The First Amendment to the U S Constitution, which deals with religious freedom at a federal level, was proposed in 1789 (the same year in which the constitution itself came into operation) and was ratified shortly after the commencement of the constitutionsec Van der Vyver (1972:104) . ** With reference to section 34 of South Africa's transitional constitution 'non-derogatable' must be read as 'non-suspendablc'. ® See also Ramcharan (1985:14-17) and Gormlcy (1985) with regard to the non-derogatability of the right to life. (Robertson, 1991:125) .11
Chapter 3 o f South A frica's transitional constitution undoubtedly conforms to in ternationally recognised standards for the protection o f religious freedom by explicitly providing for the non-derogatability o f the religious rights guaranteed in section 14. Since the limitation o f these rights is subject to the stricter necessity test, the door is open for a court to conclude that the freedom to m anifest relig ious beliefs is limitable, but that the freedom to hold them is not.
R eligiou s rights in section 14
Section 14 o f the transitional constitution provides as follows:
Religion, belief and opinion 14.
(1) Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience, relig ion, thought belief and opinion, which shall include academic free dom in institutions of higher learning.
(2) Without derogating from the generality of subsection (1), religious observances may be conducted at state or state-aided institutions under rules established by an appropriate authority for that purpose provided that such observances are conducted on an equitable basis and attendance at them is free and voluntary.
(3) Nothing in this Constitution shall preclude legislation recognising -(a) personal and family law adhered to by persons professing a particular religion; and (b) the validity of marriages concluded under a system of religious law subject to specified procedures.
For a deserving exposition of the interaction between (and, indeed, interdependence of) law/politics and religion, see also Witte (1993) .
Koers 59(2) 1994:151-168
The W .C.R.P.-S.A. proposed clause (see 1. above) reads as follows:
1. All persons are entitled:
1.1 to freedom of conscience, 1.2 to profess, practise, and propagate any religion or no religion, 1.3 to change their religious allegiance.
2.
Every religious community and/or member thereof shall enjoy the right:
2.1 to establish, maintain and manage religious institutions;
2.2 to have their particular system of family law recognised by the state;
2.3 to criticise and challenge all social and political structures and policies in terms of the teachings of their religion.
Section 14(1) o f the transitional constitution is libertarian in its purport and there can be little doubt that it provides, in a highly individualised way, for freedom o f conscience, the right to profess, practise and propagate any religion and the right to change one's religious allegiance. To this extent it is in conformity with the first subclause o f the W .C.R.P.-S.A . proposed clause. Religion, how ever, also has an institutional dimension -as appears from 2.1 o f the W .C.R.P.-S.A . pro posed clause. This institutional dimension (which the W .C.R.P.-S.A . proposed clause expresses as a right "to establish, maintain and manage religious institu tions") is catered for under the freedom o f association clause (section 17) in the transitional constitution but it can also be argued that it is already contained in section 14(1) as it stands: religious freedom by its very nature indeed entails all rights relating to a person's involvement with a religious community. The argu ment that the freedoms listed in section 14(1) should be read as including the en titlement to have them institutionally expressed, is supported by the fact that aca demic freedom (which is one o f the freedoms explicitly listed in section 14 (1)) is mentioned with reference to its concretisation in institutions o f higher learning.12 It can thus be argued that on the analogy o f academic freedom, the distinction between an establishment and a free exercise clause which is explicit in the First Amendment to the United States constitution (see also Van der Vyver, 1972:108) , Strictly 'logically' speaking the opposite can of coursc also be argued on an indusio unius est alterius exclusio basis: becausc the institutional dimension of academic freedom is mentioned explicitly, the absencc of explicit reference to the institutional dimension of religious freedom implies that, at least for purposes of section 14, the constitution-makcrs intended to exclude it. However, if a holistic and purposive approach to the interpretation of the bill of rights is followed (see 3.1 above) and entitlements arc construed liberally, an analogical extension of the academic freedom formula to religious freedom is more appropriate than its inclusio unius restriction Both approaches arc, at any rate, equally 'logical'. See also 3.1 (iii) above.
is implicit in the freedom o f religion dimension o f section 14(1). But even with out such an analogy the 'establishment' aspect o f section 14(1) is borne out by a holistic interpretation which relates the provisions o f this section to the entrench ment (in section 17) o f the right to freely associate.
The combination o f religious and academic freedom in section 14 (1) is unusual. The example (and, indeed, the wording) o f article 21(b) o f the Constitution o f the Republic o f Namibia was followed by the drafters o f South A frica's transitional bill o f rights. In the Namibian article academic freedom and the freedom to prac tise religion are, however, entrenched in two different sub-articles, namely arti cles 19(b) and (c) respectively. Because o f the tug o f war between the minimal ists and the optimalists who were involved in multi-party negotiations (see 2. above) the Technical Committee on Fundamental Rights refrained from explicitly referring to academic freedom in the initial drafts o f chapter 3. The committee was o f the opinion that " freedom o f ... thought, belief and opinion" at any rate includes academic freedom. A number o f submissions were then made to the technical committee in which the explicit constitutionalisation o f academic free dom and o f the freedom o f artistic creativity and scientific research were advo cated. The technical committee recommended to the negotiating council that explicit reference be made to academic freedom in section 14(1) and to freedom o f artistic creativity and scientific research in the freedom o f expression clause, section 15(1). This the council accepted. N ote, however, that in both instances the wording (introduced by the phrase "which shall include") suggests that the particular freedoms explicitly mentioned are at any rate included in the entitle ments initially entrenched in broad and non-specific terms.
Article 5 o f the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities (see 1. above) is concerned with people's enjoyment o f religious rights in state institu tions and it is precisely this right which section 14(2) «institutionalises. Article 5 does not, however, deal with educational institutions while section 14(2) includes them. In this sense section 14(2) to some extent supports the right to religious education elaborated on in article 4 o f the declaration although section 32(c) of the transitional constitution is more to the point in this regard.
The concern raised about systems o f family law in 2.2 o f the W .C.R.P.-S.A. pro posed clause is catered for in section 14(3) o f the transitional constitution. A per son's right to have his or her system o f family law recognised by the state is, however, not constitutionalised. Instead the section authorises the legislature to pass legislation recognising this right. The provisional nature o f section 14(3) is due to the fact that the question o f recognising the systems o f family law o f relig ious communities was raised at a very late stage o f the negotiating process and in conjunction with the highly controversial customary law issue. Although the ne gotiating council w as amenable to the constitutional recognition o f these systems, it was probably well advised to proceed with circumspection. Religious groups will now have to lobby the legislature elected on 27 April 1994 to pass the neces sary legislation in this regard. Section 14(3) will then safeguard such legislation against invalidation on, for instance, the ground that it favours certain persons or religious communities and is therefore discriminatory.
R ights am plifying and enhancing freedom o f religion
Due to the economy o f language characterising chapter 3 (see 3.1 above) relig ious rights and freedoms are not referred to elaborately -as is obvious from sec tion 14. Other provisions o f the chapter can, however, be construed as favouring the exercise o f religious freedom thereby amplifying and enhancing the provisions o f section 14. These provisions will now briefly be looked at.
Education
Section 32 o f the transitional constitution guarantees individuals' right to basic education, to equal access to education (section 32(a)) and to instruction in a lan guage o f choice where reasonably practicable (section 32(b)). Section 32(c) then proceeds to give "every person" the right to establish, where practicable, educational institutions based on a common culture, language or religion, provided that there shall be no discrimination on the ground of race (my italics -LMdP).
Section 32(c) adequately addresses the sentiments o f religious groups articulated in articles 4.5 and 4.6 o f the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities. Under the said section it will be possible for religious communities to establish and maintain their own educational institutions at pre-school, primary, secondary and tertiary levels. That these institutions will have a right to financial support by the state (subject to compliance with minimum academic norms laid down by educational authorities) is, however, not a foregone conclusion (see below).
The section furthermore excludes recourse to religious freedom as a pretext for privatised racial (but not necessarily gender) discrimination. Reference has not been made to gender discrimination in order not to preclude the possibility o f having religiously oriented single-sex schools.
Does section 32(c) warrant the constitutionality o f a provision such as section 31(1) o f the Potchefstroom se Universiteit vir Christelike Hoër Onderwys (Private) Act (19 o f 1950) which requires from the council o f the university to ensure that, in appointing academic and non-academic staff, the Christian histori cal character o f the university is maintained? At first sight it appears as if it does, but the matter is not without its complications. It is important to note that the university as a statutory body is bound by the provisions o f chapter 3 -even though the chapter operates vertically only (see 3.2 above). If in the appointment o f staff members the council o f the university therefore differentiates among pro spective candidates on the basis o f religion, its decision could be challenged on the strength o f the equality clause (section 8(1) and (2)) o f the transitional consti tution -see also 5.2 below). It could o f course be argued that section 32(c) in effect limits the provisions o f the equality clause but since the principles o f both freedom a nd equality (see e.g. sections 33(l)(a)(ii) and 35(1) o f the transitional constitution) guide the interpretation and application o f chapter 3 (see 3.2 above), this limitation has to be construed restrictively. The council o f the university could therefore act unconstitutionally if it w ere to exclude someone from ap pointment simply because his or her religion does not conform to the 'Christian historical character o f the university'. An atheist unlikely to undermine the said character will, for example, not only be eligible for appointment but could indeed challenge a decision o f the council excluding him or her from appointment mainly on the basis o f his or her atheistic beliefs.
O f more significance still are the standards laid down in article 13(3) o f the Inter national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. This article guaran tees the right o f parents to "ensure the religious and moral education o f their children in conformity with their own convictions" but at the same time it states that this right can be exercised by parents choosing "schools ... other than those established by the public authorities" . From this follows that " [t]he state is not obliged to finance such education but only to tolerate it if the parents wish to provide for it or pay for it" (Partsch, 1981:213) . Thus, even if it could be argued that the article 13(3) standards apply to tertiary education as well, it seems as though a future South African government will not be out o f step with interna tional human rights standards should it recognise the right o f the Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education to maintain its 'Christian historical character' without, however, supporting the institution financially. On the other hand, the mere fact that the right to establish an educational institution on the ba sis o f a common religion is regarded as o f sufficient significance to constitutionalise it in explicit terms, could serve as a basis for an argument that the state is un der an obligation to provide financially for such an institution. No South African university will at any rate be able to survive without financial support from the state.
Equality
Article 2 o f the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities is adamant in proclaiming the equality before the law o f religious communities. Section 8 of the transitional constitution is equally adamant in proclaiming every person's "equality before the law and ... equal protection o f the law" (section 8(1)) in pur suance o f which discrimination on the grounds o f (amongst others) religion, con science or belief are precluded (section 8(2)).
Ironically, however, the voluminous (and apprehensive) submissions on the equality provision in the transitional constitution which came from spokespersons o f religious communities did not address the entrenchment o f religious equality but rather the stipulation (in section 8(2)) that "no person shall be unfairly dis criminated against" on the ground o f "sexual orientation" .
Expression, association, language and culture
The freedom o f expression clause in the transitional constitution (section 15(1)) certainly caters for the need o f religious communities to "criticise and challenge all social and political structures and policies in terms o f the teachings o f their religion" (see 2.3 o f the W .C.R.P.-S.A. proposed clause). The transitional consti tution (section 15(2)) moreover provides that "media financed by or under the control o f the state shall be regulated in a manner which ensures impartiality and the expression o f a diversity o f opinion" . This goes a long way in addressing re ligious com munities' concern about having "reasonable access to ... publiclyowned communications m edia" (article 7 o f the Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities).
As w as pointed out previously, the freedom o f association clause in the transi tional constitution (section 17) enhances the institutionalised exercise o f religious freedom -as does section 31 (on language and cultural rights) for religious com munities to whom the exercise o f their religious freedom is closely related to or dependent on language and culture.
Access to court and administrative justice
M embers o f religious communities, like all other bodies and persons, " shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court o f law or, w here appropri ate, another independent and impartial forum" (section 22). This means that members o f a religious community can (as o f right) have recourse to either a court o f law or 'an outside referee' should they not be able to resolve their disputes among themselves. Strictly speaking, the section in the transitional constitution on administrative justice (section 24) does not bind religious communities, since the chapter on fundamental rights operates vertically only (see 3.2 above). How ever, the requirement that religious communities should comply with the precepts o f natural justice in instances where the rights o f any o f their members stand to be affected by decisions, forms part o f the law as it stands. The provision in the transitional constitution allowing for a seepage o f the provisions o f chapter 3 to horizontal relationships (section 35(3)) could therefore well be taken as reinforc-ing the right o f any member o f a religious community to the application o f (what in legal nomenclature is known as) the rules o f natural ju stice in instances where disputes between the member and the religious community concerned are to be resolved. These rules require that both sides to a dispute be heard (audi et al teram partem ) and that no person involved in the dispute can be judge in his or her own cause (nem o iudex in re sua) .13
C oncluding perspective
Chapter 3 o f the transitional constitution provides a broad framework within which religious rights and freedoms (and rights relating to them) are entrenched.
It is now for religious communities themselves to spell out exactly what the actualisation o f these rights and freedoms means in practice. The W .C.R.P.-S.A. Declaration on Religious Rights and Responsibilities is a noteworthy starting point in this regard. The courts (and especially the constitutional court) could well consult declarations or charters o f this nature in order to give content to the religious (and related) rights and freedoms entrenched in broad terms in the bill o f rights.
Religious communities are also under an obligation to make their members aware o f their rights and o f the implications o f the entrenchment o f those rights in chap ter 3. Rights are worth nothing if they are simply listed in and elaborated on in lofty statements. They are there to be used in order to help optimalise the fulfil ment o f one's calling in all the various spheres o f life. This holds, in particular, for the rights o f religious people and communities.
